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The aim of this article is to construct an analytical approach to economic
growth which captures the essential features of the interaction between the
work of the scienti…c community and long-period economic activity.
The traditional theory of growth, which originated with Solow (1956),
considers the scienti…c world to be exogenous with respect to the economy.
As in the case of other public goods, the production of knowledge is the
task of the state. Scienti…c as well as technological advances constitute
Solow’s ’residual’ - the unexplained part of the growth of per capita output.
Exceptions in this theoretical tradition are the works of Karl Shell (1969,
1970), in which the production of knowledge is endogenous. The state
collects resources from the activities of private agents in order to …nance
basic research, which is the public input to the private sector. The economic
problem analysed in these works is essentially that of the dynamic allocation
ofresourcesbetweentheproductionof goodsandtheproduction of knowledge.
Still unexplored is the scienti…c research sector in relation to its forms of
organization and the incentives - economic and otherwise - which motivate
those who work in it.
Withtheadventof’endogenousgrowththeory’ -thenewscienti…c paradigm
for the analysis of growth - innovation has become a central topic of inquiry.
The works of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman
and Helpman (1991) have generated a rich Schumpeterian strand in growth
theory which draws heavily on the microeconomic literature on industrial
innovation. These models, too, relegate the production of new opportunities
for technological progress to a residual domain exogenous to the economy.
The case of growth models with general purpose technology are emblematic
of the limitations of this approach. GPTs, in fact, are radical changes in
technologies whichimprove production possibilities ina widerangeof sectors.
These changes should certainly be associated with scienti…c advances which
alter the constraints to which technologies are subject, but there is no trace
of this phenomenon in these models.
Applied research which assesses the importance of the production of
scienti…c knowledge for innovation and …rms’ productivity shows that this
linkage has been responsible for the unprecedented growth of the Western
world (Rosenberg ).
And yet, economists (Arrow, 1962; Nelson 1959) have long concerned
themselves with the world of scienti…c research. Indeed, the studies of the
past two decades have given rise to what has been termed the ’economics
of science’ (see Stephan, 1966). This comprises the numerous empirical
works that have investigated the connections between scienti…c production
1and technological innovation, as well as those which study the scienti…c
labour market. Recently, a number of theoretical analyses have shown the
substantial di¤erencesbetweentheactivities ofscienti…cresearchandthose of
technological innovation. Dasgupta andDavid (1987; 1994) have constructed
a theoretical framework - still highly general and open - comprising the
components essential for the analytical representation of the production of
basic knowledge. The state organizes the scienti…c sector, given that the
output from scienti…c research is considered to be a public good because
of its non-rival nature and because of the full disclosure rule adopted by
researchers when they obtain new results.
The ’quest for priority’ as the essential motivation of researchers is a
decisive aspectoftheconceptualization of researchimportedfrom thesociology
ofscience (Merton, 1957). Researchers competeagainsteach other for rewards,
whichtaketheform -inthecaseof success - ofimportant publications and the
consequent advantages in terms of income, prestige and reputation. Hence,
unlike the objective of those who work in applied and technological research,
that of scientists is to achieve the widest possible circulation of their …ndings,
rather than secrecy.
Inthese winner-take-allcontextsthere isgreat uncertainty overtheoutcome
of the contest, and the problem of incentives is particularly acute because
of the di¢culty of monitoring e¤ort. The literature on academic research
agrees that the incentives system prevalent in the sector e¢ciently motivates
workers, so that problems of shirking are rare. The organization of work in
academic research is strongly characterized by di¤erent forms of cooperation
and knowledge-sharing, albeit in the presence of strictly personal goals and
…erce competition. Peer evaluation and reciprocal recognition of the value of
discoveriesare forms ofsocial interactionwhichclosely in‡uencetheproductivity
of individual researchers.
The model analysed in this paper represents the working of an economy
which consists ofagents withheterogeneous innate skills and whomay choose
to work either in the goods production sector or in scienti…c research. These
two economic activities are organized according to di¤erent objectives and
rules. Research is …nanced by the state out of taxes, and its output is a
public good that bene…ts all …rms and improves their productivity. The
researcher receives an income which depends on his/her research results.
S/he is engaged in a research project in competition with other researchers
andobtains a result before the others with aprobability whichis a function of
his/her e¤ort, of his/her innate talent for research, and his/her interactions
with other researchers. In each of these races the state rewards only the
winner, doing so with a sum that is added to his/her income.
The paper is organized as follows. the second section surveys the applied
2and theoretical literature on the relationship between science and economic
growth. The third section sets out the basic theoretical model. The fourth
section analyses the model’s equilibrium solution.
2 Science and economic growth
2.1 The empirical evidence
The in‡uence of scienti…c advances on technological innovation, and on the
productivity of economic systems, has been the subject of applied inquiry
for a number of years. The headlong technological development of recent
decades has shortened the distance between basic and applied research, so
that a substantial part of the former is today carried out internally to …rms
(Rosenberg, 1990).Diverse approaches have been used by studies on the
matter. Some examine the intensity of technological innovation by …rms,
othersestimatethee¤ects ofacademic researchonindicators of …rms’productive
performance.
The studies by Mans…eld (1991, 1995) are based on surveys of …rms’
opinions on the importance - whichthey report tobe substantial - of scienti…c
advances for innovation in products and processes. The …rst study was based
on a sample of 76 of the largest USA …rms and found that in the period
1975-1985 around 11% of new products and 9% of new processes could not
have been developed without the results of academic research conducted in
the previous …fteen years. Mans…eld estimates that the lags implicit in the
science/innovation relation are signi…cant - 7years onaverage - andmoreover
that the social rate of return on investments in academic research is of the
order of magnitude of 28%.
Anequallydirect approachhasbeen usedbyAdams(1990), whoestimates
thecontributionofscienti…c knowledgeto productivity growthin18manufacturing
sectors. The main feature of this study is its meticulous construction of an
indicator of thestock of scienti…c knowledge obtained by consideringboth the
number of publications in scienti…c …elds closest to the sector’s technology
since the 1930s, and the scienti…c personnel employed in the sector. Adams
then hypothesises the transmission of knowledge via the information media.
He estimates a model of the productivity dynamic in which he includes a
direct e¤ect of sectoral knowledge and a research spillover e¤ect, …nding
signi…cant values in both cases.
Another strand of studies consider the spatial e¤ects of research spillover
e¤ects on the innovative activities of …rms, and therefore those that derive
fromcontact orproximity betweenthetwoareas of research. Amongthemost
3important of these studies is Ja¤e (1989), which considers data on corporate
patents ineach stateoftheUSA. Amodel ofsimultaneous equations describes
the relations among expenditure on academic research, expenditure by …rms,
and the patenting activity of the later. Estimation of the model furnishes
importantspillover valuesforacademicresearch, especially forthepharmaceuticals
and chemicals industries.
2.2 The economics of science
Dasgupta and David (1987) investigate the fundamental di¤erences between
the production of knowledge in the contexts of science and technology. This
important paper laid the basis for the modern economic theory of science.
The maindi¤erences between the worlds ofscienceandtechnologicalinnovation
reside, notintheresearchobjectandmethodsofthetwocontexts, but intheir
organization and the goals pursued. The fundamental di¤erence between
them concerns the dissemination of results, which is immediate and complete
in scienti…c research as academic researchers seek to publish their discoveries
as soon as possible and obtain, through peer evaluation, recognition by the
scienti…c community of the validity of their results.This is contrary to what
happens in technological research where new knowledge is kept secret..
Thescienti…ccommunityontheonehand enjoystheadvantageofcomplete
information; on the other, it is concerned to ensure the researcher’s property
right on the item of new knowledge that s/he has produced. Because full
disclosure is the optimal solution from the point of view of society’s well-
being, this social normadoptedinthe scienti…ccommunityserves that purpose.
Obviously, full disclosure con‡icts strongly with the secrecy necessary to be
able topro…t fromtechnological innovation. Firms, infact, obtaina return on
investments inR&D inrelationtothe degree ofmarketpowerthata patentor
the restricted circulation of an innovation may generate for them. Radically
di¤erent from this objective is the ’quest for priority’ in attribution of the
paternity of a discovery that motivates academic researchers. The latter
immediately submit the results oftheir work forpublication which will certify
their priority in the discovery. From this derives recognition in monetary
terms (career advancement, awards, etc.) and in terms of reputation and
prestige in the scienti…c community.
The incentives system that operates in research is characterized by great
uncertaintyandby theprincipal’s di¢culty ofmonitoringe¤ort. Theevolution
of state-organized academic research seems to have struck a balance between
the private motivations of researchers and the needs of society. Individual
scientists take part in contests in which those who obtain a innovative result
…rst receive recognition from the scienti…c community and the advantages
4that ensure therefrom. Because the work of those who do not win is valueless,
the contest belongs to the category of tournaments in which the winner takes
all (Dasgupta, 1989; Lazear, 1997). Comparison with reality shows that this
systeme¢ciently incentivizes academicresearchers, in that they are generally
highly motivated and committed to their research. In e¤ect, this result also
derives from the assurance of an income, often from teaching duties, which
mitigates the e¤ects of the risk in research.
Therules of the academic worldfavour the spreadof forms ofcollaboration
and information-sharing which have important externalities. Scienti…c work
is often carries out by teams of researchers, in that the advantages deriving
from obtaining priority are generally indivisible, while the pooling of kindred
and specialized skills considerably increases the chances of success (Stephan
andLevin, 1992). Dataonpublications showthat collaborationshaveincreased
over time. The transmission of tacit knowledge takes place in academic
departmentswhose compositionis animportant factor inthework ofindividual
researchers. This relationship may also hold among researchers belonging to
di¤erent institutions but who work in the same …eld and interact with each
other to form ’invisible colleges’ (David, 1998).
Thethemeofincentives for academicresearchers alsorelates totheaggregate
size of the scienti…c research sector compared with that of technological
researchandthe economy ingeneral. From along-periodperspective, scienti…c
knowledge is acrucial inputtotechnological innovation. Consequently, in the
long period, it is necessary for a balance to be struck between the incentives
for scienti…c research work and the economic advantages in technological
research increased by innovations.
3 The model
We consider an economy consisting of non-overlapping generations. Each
generations lives in one period and is constituted by N individuals with
di¤erent levels ofability. Thereis onesingle …nal good, which is the numeraire
and is produced, using only the labour factor, by the consumption good
sector, which is perfectly competitive. In period t, which also constitutes
the generation t, output is produced according to the following production
function:
Yt = atLt (1)
where at is the parameter measuring the level of the technology available in
generation t, Lt is the labour factor, at grows from one generation to the
5next with the introduction of innovations produced by the research sector.
Innovations increase the productivity of workers by an amount proportional
to the productivity of the previous period. If an innovation increases the
productivity of the previous period by an amount b > 0, and ° is the
number of innovations obtained in period t (or generation t), the change
of productivity over time can be described as follows:
at = at¡1(1 +°tb) (2)
A fundamental assumption made by this paper is that the number of
potential innovations in each individual period is limited. This assumption,
which is at variance with that usually made in the literature on innovation-
driveninnovation(AghionandHowitt1992, Romer1990), was …rstintroduced
in a growth model by Zeira (2003). Its principal implication is that the
innovative race is such that a certain number of potential innovators seek to
produce the same innovation. However, only one of them will be the …rst
to do so and obtain the reward. As Zeira (2003) has shown, a race of this
kind arises only when the number of innovations is limited: otherwise, each
researcher would seek to produce a di¤erent innovation in order to maximize
his/her chances of obtaining the reward. Only if the number of potential
innovations is limited will a number of researchers greater than one seek the
same innovation. Another implication ofthe assumptionona limited number
of potential innovations is that research is not generic but focused on speci…c
innovations. In other words, the researcher identi…es what advances are
possible and concentrates his/her research e¤ort on those.
We havemadethis assumptionbecause, inour opinion, thetype ofcontest
that ensues from it successfully captures what happens in the scienti…c world,
where innovationsor advancesinascienti…cdisciplinearelimited, andscienti…c
communities are often engaged with problems on which there is consensus as
to their importance for advancing scienti…c knowledge.
Following Zeira (2003), we assume for the sake of simplicity that the
number of possible innovations is given and equal to one, so that ° = 1 if the
innovation is introduced, °= 0 if it is not.
Another assumption is that innovation is a public good produced by the
scienti…c sector within universities and transferred cost-free in the same
period to the consumption goods sector. Innovation yields a reward for
whoever produces it …rst. This reward consists in greater remuneration
…nanced by the state. In scienti…c communities, the remuneration for the
researcher usually consists in both a greater monetary reward and greater
prestige or reputation. For themoment we assumethatit consists substantially
in a monetary reward.
6We now describe the scienti…c sector in greater detail.
3.1 The research sector
Research is carried out within scienti…c communities such as universities or
other research bodies …nanced largely by the state and regulated by the
institutional rules typical of academia. These rules consist in 1) priority, 2)
full disclosure, and 3) the importance of relations and interactions among
colleagues, which intervene both in the new idea formation phase and in
evaluation of what is produced. There is therefore a strong community
component which has e¤ects on both the process by which innovations are
produced and on public recognition of those innovations. The latter are
di¤used by scienti…c publications or public media subject to the peer review
process. Relationswith colleagues are therefore extremely complex, andsince
they determine both recognition of the innovation and its di¤usion, they
determine both the possibility of obtaining the reward for its introduction,
as well as the productivity of the entire research sector (when referring
to these innovations, David, 1998, has used the term ’invisible colleges’).
Social interactions among researchers therefore in‡uence the likelihood that
a researcher will produce a particular innovation recognised by the scienti…c
community. As a consequence, they constitute a context variable for all
those involved which we call the ’social interactions e¤ect’. To capture this
e¤ect we hypothesised that the probability of an innovation being produced
by the entire scienti…c community is a function of those interactions. In
other words, relations among colleagues in‡uence the probability p(I) that
an innovation will be produced in the research sector. This implies that ex
ante the expected level of technology is given by:
e at = at¡1(1+ p(I)b) (2.b)
Meoreover, researchis carried out by individual researchers who, although
they enjoy the same context variable, have di¤erent probabilities of being the
…rst to produce the speci…c innovation. The probabilities depend directly on
the resources that the individual researcher devotes to the research, and
inversely on the resources devoted to the same research activity by other
researchers. The latter therefore constitute another context variable, which
we may call the ’competition e¤ect’. This captures the e¤ect ofthe innovative
contest to be the …rst to produce a speci…c innovation. Consequently, the
more the resources employed by others, the less the researcher’s likelihood of
being …rst.
7In short, the probability that an individual researcher will be the …rst to
obtain an innovation is as follows:
pi;t = p(EjI) (3)
where E is the event ’an individual is the …rst to obtain an innovation’
and I is the event ’an innovation occurs in that scienti…c context’. If the two
events are independent, (3) becomes pi;t = pi(E)p(I):
Hence, pi(E)depends directly ontheresourcesthattheindividual researcher
devotes to his/her research, denotedby hi, andinversely on theresources that




The resources used by the individual researcher consist substantially in
e¤ort - which has a cost in terms of utility that is greater, the higher
the level of the technology to be achieved - and in the researcher’s mental
abilities, ±i, which are hypothesised to be heterogeneous among individuals
and distributed among the population according to a given distribution
function F(±). More speci…cally, it is assumed that mental ability increases
the likelihood of being …rst to produce an innovation, and that it is very
important only in the case of activity research, whilst it does not in‡uence
the productivity of these same agents if they work in the consumption good
sector. If mental ability is productive only if it is applied to research, it
follows that only more able individuals undertake that activity - given that
they will have a higher relative pay-o¤ from it - while less able ones will
undertake the alternative activity. This implies that there is a threshold
level of ability z > 0 such that if ±i < z, the individual will choose the
alternative activity; if ±i ¸ z, s/he will choose to enter the research sector.
Overall, the set of resources devoted to research by an individual researcher
is given by hi = ±iei, where ei is the e¤ort of the i-th researcher, whilst the





. Substituting, one obtains pi(E) = ei±i R 1
z h(±)dF(±):
As regards the probability that the research sector as a whole will achieve
an innovation (p(I)) is, as said, determined by the system of interactions










8where we hypothesised that N = 1. Thisindicatorhasbeen usedbyBernabou
(1996a and1996b) tocapture the e¤ectsofsocial interactions on the formation
of local human capital. In the case analysed by us, the context e¤ects which
in‡uence the probability of achieving aninnovationconstitute a social capital
typical of the research sector that can be used by all those who belong to it.
The choice of this indicator is suggested by the fact that it makes it possible
to capture various aspects of social interactions according to the value taken
by the parameter {
In fact, if
1
{ > 0, then the agents are complementary and heterogeneity
between agents is costly . Hence the presence of individuals who have
committeda lowamountofresourcesgreatly reduces thatprobability, whereas
if
1
{ < 0, individuals are substitute and heterogeneity in terms of resources
devoted to the research does not represent a cost. Benabou (1996a, 1996b)
showsthatcomplementarity orsubstitutability amongagents may beconnected
with social behaviours whereby conformism prevails in the former case (peer
e¤ect), and the search for status in the latter (role-model e¤ect). Which of
the two types of behaviour is more probable in the research sector is not
clear a priori. Some authors maintain that conformism is very widespread,
but there is no de…nitive evidence on this, for which reason it is important
to admit both hypotheses.
Description of the research sector is completed with introduction of the
expected utility function: from this can be derived the optimum level of
e¤ort devoted by the individual researcher to his/her research. Given the
hypotheses introduced previously, this will be given by the expected income
minus the disutility of the e¤ort:






where d > 0 and 0 < ¾ < 1 are two parameters which capture the disutility
deriving from the e¤ort, while me at is the monetary reward deriving from the
innovation, proportional to the level of the technology. On substituting the
expressions found for pi(E) and for p(I) into (4), it becomes:















which when maximized with respect to ei gives the optimum e¤ort level
chosen by the researcher, given the amount of resources invested by other
researchers, andgiventheentiresector’sprobabilityofachievingtheinnovation


















Evinced by (6) is that as individual ability increases so do the resources
invested in the research activity. Hence more able individuals are more likely
to bethe …rst toproduce aninnovation, not only because their ability directly
in‡uences that probability and because they are those most incentivized to
invest in the research activity. Given individual ability, the two context
indicators show that this e¤ort also depends on the expected value of the
amount of resources invested by other researchers h(±).
In this regard we assume rational expectations in the sense that the
expected value is the optimum value chosen by the other researchers when
they consider the behaviour of the others as given. On this hypothesis, we
















































Substituting (7) and (8) in (6) and then again (5) yields the maximum




















The i-th individual’s maximum level of utility increases with his/her
ability, and follows a non-univocal pattern with respect to the ability level
representing the ability threshold above which individuals enter the research
sector (z > 0). More precisely, the maximum utility increases with the
10increaseinz ifthecompetition e¤ectpredominates amongthevarious researchers.
In fact, an increase in the i-th individual’s maximum level of utility increases
with his/her ability, and follows a non-univocal pattern with respect to the
ability level representing the ability threshold above which individuals enter
the research sector (z > 0). More precisely, the maximum utility increases
with the increase in z if the competition e¤ect is strong enough. In fact, an
increase in z is equivalent to a decrease in the number of individuals engaged
in research, so that there is less competition and consequently a greater
probability of being …rst. By contrast, if theinteractions e¤ect predominates,
a reduction of the researchsector (i.e. an increase in z) reduces the maximum
utility obtainable in the research sector.
More particularly …gures (1) and (2) show the indirect utility function,
which is increasing and convex in ±i, in the two situations. In …g. (1)
competition e¤ect prevails, then an increse in the ability of the marginal
researcher thatentersinthesector (i.ean increase in z), provokesa movement
along the ui curve, and in the same time an upwards shifts of the curve, since
this reduce the number of competitors. While when social interactions e¤ect
prevails an increase in z will induce the same movement along the curve but
also a downwards shift of it.
Fig.1 and 2 here
3.2 The consumption good sector
In the consumption good sector, as said, we assume that ability is not
importantin determining labour productivity. Eachworkercansupplyinelastically
one unit of labour factor, and there is no disutility connected with the work
activity. This means that once the ability level beyond which individuals
choosethe researchsector hasbeen determined, the laboursupply is in…nitely
elastic until it reaches the ability limit value. Given these assumptions, the
utility obtainable in this sector is given by:
uy = c (10)
which is maximized under the constraint that c ￿ wy, where wy is the wage
obtainable in that sector.
This sector receives technology from the research sector at no cost, but
it pays taxes that the state uses to fund the research sector. Considering
the production function (1) and bearing in mind that this sector operates
in perfect competition, pro…ts net of taxes are de…ned as follows: ¼ = (1 ¡
11¿)Yt ¡ wyLt, where ¿ denotes the tax rate. Maximization of this function
yields the wages in the consumption good sector, as given by:
wy = (1¡ ¿)e at: (11)
3.3 The public sector
The state levies taxes on the consumption good sector in order to …nance
production of the public good by the research sector. The …nancing consists
in an amount of monetary income which is distributed only to those who
win the innovation contest. It has been repeatedly emphasised, in fact, that
the income of researchers working in the public sector consists of a share
connected with innovative activity - i.e. a reward paid only if innovation
is produced - and a share which is instead independent of production of
innovation, and which shelters researchers against the risk of not producing
any innovation.
Given these hypotheses, the state’s budget constraint can be represented
as follows:
me atp(I) = p(I)¿e atLt (12)
4 Equilibrium
In order to determine the general equilibrium, it is necessary to de…ne what
shareofworkersentertheresearchsectorandwhatinsteadenterstheconsumption
good sector. To this end, we must determine what, in equilibrium, is the
ability level that divides the group of those who select the consumption good
sector from those who select the research sector. This will be the ability level
at which the marginal worker is indi¤erent between the two sectors, which
comes about when the following conditionholds: ut;y = ut;R(z). Substituting






















From the solution of this equation one obtains the equilibrium value of z
that determines the percentage of individuals who enter the research sector
(given by 1¡F(z)) and the percentage of those who enter the consumption
12good sector. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that ability is
distributed uniformly among theentirepopulation, withvalues in the interval





























The choice of the uniform distribution of individuals’ abilities entails the
following assumption concerning the parameters:






The right hand side represents the utility that the marginal researcher
derives form choosing the research sector. It depends on z for two reasons.
First of all it directly a¤ects the productivity of the marginal researcher,
given that the ability of a worker modi…es the probability of obtaining an
innovation. However z determines also the size of the research sector, which
in turn determines the social interactions e¤ect, the competition e¤ect and
the premium derived from innovation. Therefore the RHS of eq. (14) picks
either individual e¤ects of changes in the ability, either contextual e¤ects
of changes in z. Graphically, the RHS of equation (14) rapresents both
movement along the ui;due to changes in the ability of worker; as well as its
translations due to changes in contextual e¤ects caused by changes in the
size of research sector.
The left-hand side of this equation represents the oppurtunity cost of the
researchsector choice, inequilibrium the marginal worker must be indi¤erent
between the two choices.





























The LHS of this equation is always decreasing and concave in z. While
as concern the RHS, according to the values assumed by Â, it may be always
13increasing; or it may increase for a stretch and then decrease. This implies
that, as the case may be, there is a single equilibrium value of z, or two
possible equilibria. In this regard the results can be summed up by the
following:
Proposition 1 ² When 1+¾
1+2¾ < Â < 1 i.e. the cost of heterogeneity is
high (there is an high degree of complementarity) there exists a single
stable equilibrium with z < 1.
² When -1 < Â < 0, or 1 < Â < +1, i.e the cost of heterogeneity is low
(the degree of complentarity is low, or there is substitutability among
agents), there may be multiple equilibria: one in which z = 1, the other
in which z < 1.
² Which equilibrium prevails depends on the initial value of z.
For high values ofz, i.e. when the research sector is verylow, equilibrium
with no research sector prevails (no-growth trap).
While if the initial dimension of research sector isnot low, the equilibrium
with a positive research sector will emerge.
² When the equilibrium is characterized by z < 1, an increase in the
parameters s and ¿ and a decrease in the parameter d give rise to an
increase in the research sector.
Proof.
² Whentheleft-handside ofequation(14.b) (hereafter LHS) is calculated
in z = 0, it assumes a positive value, whereas in z = 1 it is nil.
Moreover, it is decreasing and concave in z.
As regards the right-hand side (RHS), when 1+¾
1+2¾ < Â < 1, the RHS
calculated in z= 0 is nil, whilst when calculated in z = 1 it tends to+1
and the derivative is always increasing.
This entails that the equilibrium (z) exists and is unique; moreover,
z < 1.
² When -1 < Â < 0, and 1 < Â < +1 , the LHS is still decreasing,
concaveandLHS(0)=0andLHS(1)=0, whileRHS(0) = 0andRHS(1) =













14Moreover it is concave for z within [0;b[, while it is convex for z within
]b;1] where b >
2¾(Â¡1)
(Â¡1)(3¾+1)+Â¾. This implies that there may be two
cases: a single equilibrium, characterized by z = 1, otherwise there
may be three equilibria, of which one is unstable and two are stable.
The two stable equilibria are characterized by z < 1 and z = 1.
In …g. (3) we represent the equilibrium condition (eq.14) when 1+¾
1+2¾ <
Â < 1; while in …g. (4) the same condition when -1 < Â < 0 and Â > 1:On
the stability of equilibria see appendix.
Fig.3 and 4 here
This result highlights that, if the heterogeneity is costly (in other words
if there is an high degree of complementarity), there will be always an
equilibriumwithapositiveresearchsector. Whilewhenthecost ofheterogeneity
isnothigh(i.e. there is alowdegreeofcomplementarity or thereis substitutability)
then the initial size of the research sector is decisive for determining the
type of equilibrium that will prevail. A too small research sector is at risk
of disappearing altogether, leading the economy to an equilibrium without
growth. If instead the research sector is initially of su¢cient size, then in
equilibrium there will be a positive share of the population that enters the
research sector.
Thisresultcanbe explained by consideringthata highdegreeof complementarity
implies a low social exchange between agents, then the e¤ect of externalities
deriving from social interactions is low, this implies that the initial dimension
of the research sector is not relevant to determine the …nal result. While if
there is a low level of complementarity or there is substitutability between
agents, this indicates that there is an high social exchange between agents,
thentheinitialsizeofresearchsectorisimportantindetermining the relevence
of externalitites e¤ect and then the …nal result.
Finally proposition 1 states that when z<1, policies aimend to increase
individual e¢ciency in research (a reduction of d), or to support research
activity itself with greater state funding (an increase in ¿), increase the
equilibrium size of the research sector.
We now determine the growth rate of this economy, showing the relation
between it and the size of the research sector.
5 The steady-state growth rate
Inthis economy thegrowthratewill beanexpectedvalue, giventhatinnovation
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is the probability that the research
sector as a whole will produce an innovation. On substituting equations (8)
and (12) into this expression and into the expression de…ning the expected



















As shown by (16) the relation between the expected growth rate and the
sizeoftheresearchsector is not univocal. More speci…cally, it may bethat the
function enables identi…cation of an optimum value of z whichestablishes the
size of the research sector that maximizes the growth rate. In fact, extreme
values of z entail an industrial (or research) sector that is too small and as a
consequence slows down the economy’s growth rate.
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6 Appendix
Equilibrium requires that noworker changes thesectorofactivity, this happens
when the utility which the marginal researcher derives from the alternative
sector is equal to the utility derived from research sector. To see the stability
of equilibrium points consider what happens in di¤erent points.
Graphically the equilibrium can be represented as follows:
Fig. 5 here
Point A is a stable equilibrium since points on the right hand side (left
hand side), indicates situations where the utility which the marginal worker
derives from the research sector is higher (lower) than the utility s/he derives
from the alternative sector.This implies a decrease (increase) in z. Point B
is not a stable equilibrium, since in points on the right hand side, the utility
derived from the alternative sector is higher than the utility drerived from

















Figure 3: Equilibrium when the cost of heterogeneity is high
z 0 z=1
(a) (b)
z 0 z=1 z*1 z*2
Figure 4: Equilibrium when the cost of heterogeneity is low
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